The definitive war diary of Marshal Eremenko. Marshal Eremenko Eremenko Andrey Ivanovich brief biography

2(14).10.1892-19.11.1970

Born on October 14, 1892 in the village of Markovka, now an urban-type settlement in the Lugansk region of Ukraine. Russian. Member of the CPSU(b)/CPSU since 1918.

Called up for military service in 1913. In World War I he fought as a private on the Southwestern Front in Galicia. Then he served on the Romanian front in the reconnaissance team of an infantry regiment. After the February Revolution of 1917, he was elected to the regimental committee.

Having been demobilized, A.I. Eremenko returned to Markovka and in 1918 organized a partisan detachment there, which later joined the Red Army.

Participant in the Civil War. From January 1919 - deputy chairman and military commissar of the Markov Revolutionary Committee. From June 1919, he participated in battles on the Southern, Caucasian and Southwestern fronts as chief of intelligence, then chief of staff of a cavalry brigade, assistant commander of the cavalry regiment of the 14th Cavalry Division of the 1st Cavalry Army. He showed courage and bravery in battles with the White Guards and White Poles.

In 1923 A.I. Eremenko graduated from the Higher Cavalry School, in 1925 - advanced training courses for command personnel, in 1931 - courses for single-commanders at the Military-Political Academy, in 1935 - the Military Academy named after M.V. Frunze.

After the Civil War, from December 1929, Eremenko A.I. commanded a cavalry regiment, from August 1937 - a cavalry division, and from 1938 - the 6th Cavalry Corps, with which he participated in the liberation campaign in Western Belarus. Since June 1940 - commander of the mechanized corps. From December 1940 he commanded the 1st Separate Red Banner Army in the Far East.

During the Great Patriotic War from July 1941, General Eremenko A.I. - Deputy Commander of the Western Front, led the military operations of the troops in the Battle of Smolensk. In August - October 1941, he commanded the Bryansk Front, which covered the approaches to Moscow from the southwest. In difficult conditions, front troops fought with Guderian’s tank group; in these battles A.I. Eremenko was wounded.

After his recovery, from December 1941, he commanded the 4th Shock Army, which, under his leadership, as part of the troops of the North-Western and then the Kalinin fronts, liberated the cities of Andreapol, Toropets, Velizh and others during the Toropets-Kholm operation.

In January 1942, Eremenko A.I. was seriously wounded and was recovering until August 1942. In August 1942, he took command of the South-Eastern Front, which was transformed into the Stalingrad Front on August 30 of the same year. In this position, Colonel General Eremenko A.I. made a great contribution to the organization of the heroic defense of Stalingrad. Front troops under his command took an active part in the counter-offensive of Soviet troops near Stalingrad, which ended in the encirclement of a large group of Nazi troops.

Since January 1943, A.I. Eremenko commanded the Southern Front. Under his leadership, front troops launched a strike in the direction of Rostov-on-Don with the goal of defeating (in cooperation with the troops of the Transcaucasian Front) the enemy group in the North Caucasus.

From April 1943 he commanded the Kalinin Front, and from October of the same year - the 1st Baltic Front. On August 27, 1943, Colonel General Eremenko A.I. awarded the highest military rank of "Army General".

From February to April 15, 1944, Army General Eremenko A.I. commanded the troops of the Separate Primorsky Army, which, together with the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front, liberated Crimea.

Since April 23, 1944 A.I. Eremenko - commander of the 2nd Baltic Front. In cooperation with the 1st and 3rd Baltic Fronts, the troops of the 2nd Baltic Front entrusted to him participated in the liberation of Latvia.

For skillful leadership of troops and courage and heroism shown in battles with the Nazi invaders, by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dated July 29, 1944, Army General Andrei Ivanovich Eremenko was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Gold Star medal (No. 5323) .

In March 1945, Army General Eremenko A.I. appointed commander of the 4th Ukrainian Front, whose troops captured the Moravian-Ostrava industrial region during the liberation of Czechoslovakia. During the war years, the versatility of A.I.’s military talent was clearly revealed. Eremenko.

After the end of the Great Patriotic War, Army General Eremenko A.I. commanded the troops of the Carpathian, West Siberian and North Caucasus military districts (1945-58). On March 11, 1955, he was awarded the highest military rank of “Marshal of the Soviet Union.”

Since 1958, Marshal of the Soviet Union Eremenko A.I. - Inspector General of the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense. He was elected as a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee (since 1956), a deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the 2nd-8th convocations. Died on November 19, 1970. He was buried in the hero city of Moscow on Red Square near the Kremlin wall.

Awarded 5 Orders of Lenin, Order of the October Revolution, 4 Orders of the Red Banner, 3 Orders of Suvorov 1st degree, Order of Kutuzov 1st degree, medals, as well as foreign orders. In 1970 he was awarded the title "Hero of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic". Awarded with an Honorary Arms.

Name of Hero of the Soviet Union Eremenko A.I. was assigned to the Ordzhonikidze Higher Combined Arms Command School, streets in the cities of Kerch, Riga, Donetsk, Snezhnoye, Slavyansk, and a trawler of the Ministry of Fisheries. At the headquarters of the North Caucasus Military District in the city of Rostov-on-Don, a memorial plaque was installed in memory of the Hero Commander.

Marshal Andrei Ivanovich Eremenko left behind amazingly interesting diaries. Without cuts, sternly and quite frankly, he talks about what he sees around him: about officers and soldiers, about the operations that he conducts, and much more, by the way, and very unexpected.

“Comrade Stalin is significantly to blame for the extermination of military personnel before the war, which affected the combat effectiveness of the army,” Eremenko writes in 1943, talking about his dialogue with Stalin, which took place on August 5. This was the only time when the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and even then, only for a day, was at the front.

Andrey Ivanovich Eremenko, 1941. (wikipedia.org)

Eremenko may seem like a grouch, but that’s why this is a diary, to give assessments without regard to those around him. He writes about the mediocrity of officers, because of which soldiers die, accuses the generals of lordship, and about Grechko he writes: “an inexperienced commander and also soft-hearted.”

Eremenko’s fate is similar to the fate of other marshals of the Soviet Union: he was drafted into the tsarist army and from that moment did not part with military service. He studied at the Frunze Military Academy and managed to change several positions before the war. He avoided the pre-war meat grinder, for which he blamed Stalin. And after the war he remained in prominent military positions: he was the commander of the Carpathian Military District, the West Siberian Military District and, finally, the North Caucasus Military District.

Khrushchev, Kirichenko, Chuyanov and Eremenko, 1942. (wikipedia.org)

The fate of a typical warrior: wounded in October 1941, but died calmly and quite on his laurels in his own bed in 1970. Interestingly, he became a marshal only ten years after the end of the war, in 1955. And this despite the fact that he considered his merits, in particular in the outcome of the Battle of Stalingrad, to be insufficiently appreciated.

Eremenko Andrey Ivanovich
14. 10. 1892 - 19. 11. 1970

Hero of the Soviet Union
Marshal of the Soviet Union

Born on October 14, 1892 in the village of Markovka, now an urban-type settlement in the Lugansk region of Ukraine. Russian. Member of the CPSU(b)/CPSU since 1918.

Having been demobilized, A.I. Eremenko returned to Markovka and in 1918 organized a partisan detachment there, which later joined the Red Army.

From February to April 15, 1944, Army General Eremenko A.I. commanded the troops of the Separate Primorsky Army, which, together with the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front, liberated Crimea.

After the end of the Great Patriotic War, Army General Eremenko A.I. commanded the troops of the Carpathian, West Siberian and North Caucasian military districts (1945-58). On March 11, 1955, he was awarded the highest military rank of “Marshal of the Soviet Union.”

Since 1958, Marshal of the Soviet Union Eremenko A.I. - Inspector General of the Group of Inspectors General of the USSR Ministry of Defense. He was elected as a candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee (since 1956), deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the 2nd-8th convocations.

Died on November 19, 1970.
He was buried in the hero city of Moscow on Red Square near the Kremlin wall.

Awarded 5 Orders of Lenin
Order of the October Revolution
4 Orders of the Red Banner
3 Orders of Suvorov, 1st degree
Order of Kutuzov 1st degree
medals
Honorary weapon with a golden image of the State Emblem of the USSR
foreign orders.
Hero of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR)

Name of Hero of the Soviet Union Eremenko A.I. was assigned to the Ordzhonikidze Higher Command School, streets in the cities of Kerch, Riga, Donetsk, Snezhnoye, Slavyansk, and a trawler of the Ministry of Fisheries. At the headquarters of the North Caucasus Military District in the city of Rostov-on-Don, a memorial plaque was installed in memory of the Hero Commander.

Works: Combat episodes. Campaigns of the First Cavalry Army. Rostov n/d, 1957;
In a western direction. M., 1959;
Against the falsification of the history of the Second World War. Ed. 2nd. M., 1960;
Stalingrad. M., 1961;
At the beginning of the war. M.. 1965;
Years of retribution. 1943-1945. M., 1969;
Remember the war. Donetsk, 1971.

It is well known that Marshal Georgy Zhukov had a very difficult character.

According to evidence, he was not distinguished by politeness, he was often rude and used obscenities. However, there is nothing strange in this, after all, he came from the people, from the common people.

Zhukov came from a completely different environment than the noble marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky.

However, the memories of the Marashal turned out to be extremely politically correct, as they say now.

Perhaps this is not so much the merit of the marshal, but of the editors, who had a great hand in his memoirs - once he was even forced to write about how he, the marshal, went to consult with Colonel Brezhnev.

Nevertheless, the fact remains. In his memoirs, Zhukov does not send anyone to... or to..., but on the contrary, he remembers many with gratitude.

Not a single person was insulted in Zhukov's memoirs... well, almost everyone except one. Delov - just one sentence, but what...

It was about the marshal Andrey Ivanovich Eremenko.Prominent Soviet military leader, promoter and fellow countryman Marshal K.E. Vorshilov.

Remembering pre-war life, Zhukov wrote:

“The troops did not like Eremenko for his stupidity and arrogance.”

Not a single person on the pages of Georgy Konstantinovich’s memoirs was insulted by him, although it is possible that he deserved it.

EREMENKO'S ANSWER

In 1957, during the disgrace of Marshal Zhukov, Eremenko became Khrushchev’s new favorite and began to revile Marshal Zhukov in every possible way.

Eremenko even wrote a book --"Against falsification of war history" where he “exposed” much of what Zhukov claimed, although often without evidence.

On the pages of the book, Eremenko answered Zhukov even more abruptly:

“Zhukov, this usurper and rude man, treated me very badly, simply not humanly. He trampled everyone in his path... I already worked with comrade Zhukov, and I know him like a pie.

This is a scary and narrow-minded man. A careerist of the highest order... It should be said that Zhukov’s operational art is a 5-6 times superiority in forces, otherwise he will not get down to business, he does not know how to fight in numbers, and builds his career on blood.”

It is quite difficult to understand the origins of the marshals' enmity.

It is possible that in the eyes of Zhukov, Eremenko really did not look like the best representative of the human race and he did not love him completely sincerely, so to speak, not for his eyes and Ukrainian accent, but for very specific human qualities.

In turn, Eremenko had reason to be offended by Zhukov. He liked to complain that Georgy Konstantinovich took away the laurels of the winner at Stalingrad by removing Andrei Ivanovich from command and putting Rokossovsky in his place.

And yet there was something about Eremenko that not only Zhukov did not like.

OPINION OF VASILEVSKY

Poet and writer Konstantin Simonov shortly before death marshal Vasilevsky had a conversation with him

Simonov recalled his conversation with Vasilevsky about Eremenko:

“We talked about different topics. First the conversation turned to Eremenko.

I heard a rather harsh description of Eremenko as a searching, dexterous person and capable in some cases of sycophancy, and in others of deception and misrepresentation.”

And here is more evidence from Vasilevsky:

“He knew how to get out and at the same time had a great ability to fawn. According to my observations, he did not like to crawl out of the dugout or dungeon. Didn't like it very much.

During the period of the offensive south of Stalingrad and the events near Kotelnikovo, I had the opportunity to travel a lot, but I don’t remember having to travel with Eremenko.”

This is the opinion of Marshal Vasilevsky about Marshal Eremenko.....

TYMOSHENKO AND YEREMENKO ARE RUINING THE WESTERN FRONT

In addition to sycophancy, one of Andrei Ivanovich’s expressive traits was boundless, unlimited bragging.

With the beginning of the war, it was A.I. Eremenko was recalled from the Far East, where he commanded the 1st Red Banner Army - and on the eighth day of the war he joined the command staff of the Western Front.

The front itself was headed by Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, who demanded that all the necessary reserves be transferred to him.

So at the beginning of July, the Western Front was given 7 fresh armies of the second strategic echelon - 1 million people + 2000 tanks.

This was a lot; the Polar Fleet had the greatest support in terms of numbers and technical strength.

However, this somehow did not help much, the Polar Front was defeated for the 2nd time....Tymoshenko drove the mechanized corps into the swamps, the infantry was defeated...

By July 19, the Germans had already occupied most of Smolensk and surrounded a significant part of the Soviet troops

Tymoshenko destroyed the front, but what exactly did Eremenko do for this?

Eremnenko creates five strike task forces and begins to “poke” them at the Germans, here and there, and there is no coordination in the actions of these groups

As a result, according to the Germans, by the end of July they captured 300,000 people and 3,000 tanks and the same number of guns as prisoners in the Smolensk area.

In 1941, having become commander of the Bryansk Front, he promised Stalin “to defeat the scoundrel Guderian.”...

Guderian may be a scoundrel, but you cannot deny him mastery of the art of war, just as you cannot deny him the honorary title of father of the Wehrmacht tank forces. In general, he was one of Hitler’s smartest military leaders.

Eremenko was never able to stop Guderian and prevent the bloody disaster that happened to the Southwestern Front, which was surrounded near Kiev and lost more than half a million people, and the front commander Kirponos died.

Subsequently, most of the troops of the Bryansk Front under the command of Eremenko were surrounded.

It must be said that Eremenko, if he was a sycophant, was a very skillful and experienced sycophant. How else can one explain the fact that Comrade Stalin did not give his hot head a cooling lead shower.

The commander of the Western Front, Pavlov, was shot after a half-hour trial.

It should be noted that his fellow countryman Kliment Voroshilov played an important role in Andrei Ivanovich’s career, who not only endowed him with new positions, but also protected him from Stalin’s righteous anger....

In this regard, Eremenko was no different from Voroshilov’s nominees who were executed in 1937.

FRONT EVIDENCE

It is worth mentioning that our fellow countryman Markov, while rolling a barrel at Zhukov, himself was not distinguished by virtue in his interactions with others.

Eremenko’s conflict with the front’s military council is well known.

This is how Eremenko himself described it:

"... I would also like to dwell on one very characteristic case.

When I commanded the troops of the Bryansk Front at the beginning of the war, in September the [German] tank army put especially strong pressure on our left flank, that is, on the left flank of the 13th Army. To help the young commander, Comrade Gorodnyansky, I sent my deputy, Comrade Efremov.

To strengthen the 13th Army, I allocated one rifle division and one tank brigade from my reserve, but things did not improve there. I decided to go there personally and this is what I established there, having visited the troops on the very left flank. It turned out that the enemy was pressing on the left flank of the 13th Army, broke into our units, and carried away two of our guns on their wedges.

I took the necessary measures on the spot, gave instructions to two division commanders for a counterattack, and then went to the military control center. There I found Comrade. Efremov and a member of the Army Military Council in charge of the rear, comrade Ganenko.

These friends were sitting around a table laid with plenty of food and drink and playing chess. [Or rather], Comrade played. Ganenko with one staff officer, and comrade Efremov was with them as a consultant.

When we approached the air defense station, we heard shells exploding at the railway station in our rear, 3 km from us. It turned out that these were the shells that, on my order, were sent to the 13th Army, but stood for a day unloaded and now they were exploding, ignited by fascist aircraft.

And so, when we came from Comrade. Mazepov to the school where the chess company was sitting... If I had not seen it myself, I would not have believed that in such a difficult period, Soviet commanders - communists, responsible people, could just sit, drink and play chess.

I spent the whole night visiting the troops and was quite tired and wanted to eat, [but] when I saw this company, [then] I boiled inside, but without showing it, I poured wine for myself and Mazepov and said:

- Let's drink to those who are losing our country at chess.

It blew t[s] up. Gonenko, apparently, what gave him courage was the fact that he was drunk. He stood up (everyone was sitting before) and came to me...:

- Comrade commander, be careful with your language, don’t insult me, I’m a member of the Central Committee.

This blew my mind and I wanted to beat him up, but there was nothing, my weapon remained in the car. But I got them, Efremov and Ganenko, in such a hurry that they didn’t know where to go. I sent Efremov to the front command post, and I myself remained in the army to help Gorodnyansky.

After this incident, Comrade Ganenko sent an encrypted message to Stalin, in which he laid out a complaint against me that I had insulted him greatly.

This encryption came [to] me, on it was Stalin’s resolution with the following content: “Comrade Eremenko, what’s the matter, report.”

[In response] I told Stalin everything as it happened. [Later] I was told by those who were present [that] when Stalin read my report, he laughed great and said:

“Eremenko did the right thing, but it could have been tougher.”

This is how Eremenko himself described everything.....but for the sake of fairness, it is worth citing the testimony of Commissioner Ganenko himself, who described everything completely differently.

Complaint sent to Stalin on September 19, 1941 by a member of the Military Council of the 13th Army, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus, Brigade Commissar Ganenko:

“Staying on the front line last night, General Efremov and I returned to the army staff task force to develop an offensive order.

The front commander Eremenko arrived here with a member of the Military Council Mazepov, in front of them the following scene played out: Eremenko, without asking anything, began to reproach the Military Council for cowardice and betrayal of the Motherland

To my comments that such heavy accusations should not be thrown, Eremenko rushed at me with his fists and hit me in the face several times , threatened to shoot.

I said that he can shoot, but he has no right to humiliate the dignity of a communist and a deputy of the Supreme Council.

Then Eremenko took out his Mauser, but Efremov’s intervention prevented him from firing a shot.

After that, he began to threaten Efremov with execution.

Throughout this ugly scene, Eremenko hysterically shouted curses, having cooled down somewhat, Eremenko began to boast that he, allegedly with Stalin’s approval, beat several corps commanders, and broke the head of one.

Having sat down at the table for dinner, Eremenko forced Efremov to drink vodka with him, and when the latter refused, he began to shout with curses that Efremov was in opposition to him and could no longer be his deputy, especially since he could not punch formation commanders in the face.

I ask you to accept your decision."

This is how Ganenko described it.....but we are unlikely to ever know exactly how it happened.

It is worth noting that Eremenko’s rudeness and martinetry had slightly different origins than Zhukov’s.

Georgy Konstantinovich was rude and threatened to shoot him based on his confidence in his correct assessment of the situation and could not stand it when people objected to him.

The courage of the massacre that took possession of Andrei Ivanovich was the classic courage of a sycophant:

“I kissed Stalin himself, and here you small fry are gaping at me.”

Many will consider this definition somewhat rude, but excuse me, that’s how he was, and there’s no getting around it.

It is worth noting that m Arshal Zhukov accused Eremenko of falsification in 1965:

“A.I. plays a particularly unsightly role in this. EREMENKO, who, frankly speaking, has lost all conscience.

Take his latest work, At the Beginning of War. Everything that he wrote about events, about people, about the enemy is a kind of background against which he decorated his person to the utmost.

He did not even stop at fabricating Stalin’s speech, allegedly delivered at a meeting of the senior command staff in 1940, while Stalin was not at this meeting at all. As is known, only Zhdanov and Malenkov were present at this meeting.

He also composed Stalin’s speech at the Politburo discussion of the military-strategic game in January 1941.

I do not want to touch here on his outrageous inventions about his role in the counter-offensive operation in the Stalingrad area and the activities of Khrushchev.

Somebody knows their role. And it is no coincidence that Eremenko was removed by Stalin from the operation to eliminate the encircled enemy group, and the troops entrusted to him were transferred to the Don Front.

Unfortunately, Eremenko is not the only one who suffers from the desire to glorify himself on the pages of the press. It’s time to stop their selfish activities.”

STALINGRAD

When talking about Andrei Ivanovich’s leadership abilities, they say, “Well, what can we take from him?”

Yes, he was not the rebirth of Alexander the Great and Markov's Caesar and Napoleon did not come out of him and could not have come out.

The echo of the Stalingrad cannonades hit Eremenko’s head so hard that he later saw himself as the main winner in this battle. All this is only partly true.

He played an important role in defense, but he did not play the most important role....

Directly led the defense of the city General Chuikov, it was he who withstood the brunt of the Stalingrad battles

And it was he, Chuikov, who wrote the written manuals on the tactics of fighting in the city, which later came in handy during the storming of Berlin.

Andrei Ivanovich Eremenko did not like urban battles and preferred to sit on the opposite bank of the Volga, unoccupied by the enemy, and Stalin himself could drive him to Stalingrad with great difficulty.

Joseph Stalin expressed his opinion in a unique way.

On August 25, 1942, at 5:15 a.m., Stalin dictated a telegram to Stalingrad:

"Personally to Vasilevsky, Malenkov

It amazes me that on the Stalingrad front there was exactly the same breakthrough far to the rear of our troops that took place last year on the Bryansk front, with the enemy reaching Oryol.

It should be noted that the same Zakharov was then the chief of staff on the Bryansk Front, and Comrade’s trusted man. Eremenko was the same Rukhle. It's worth thinking about this.

Either Eremenko does not understand the idea of a second echelon in those places of the front where unfired divisions stand on the front line, or we have here someone’s evil will, precisely informing the Germans about the weak points of our front ... "

Something flashed here about how deep battle formations were imposed on Eremenko, and he kicked back and was indignant..."

Stalin sharply criticized Eremenko's destructive method of leadership... not just criticized, but hinted at possible betrayal.

Rukhle was then slandered and compromised as a traitor, and Eremenko, on the contrary, gave all the prerequisites for accusing him of treason.

Eremenko thought big, so he loved artillery.

He dragged guns, divisions, and batteries from place to place, creating maneuverable fire. In short, he did not like the front lines, but what he did in the rear, he did skillfully and sparing no effort. This is what he should be given credit for.

Eremenko was also credited with saying that the Military Council of the Stalingrad Front, represented by Colonel General A. I. Eremenko and member of the Military Council N. S. Khrushchev, sent to Headquarters its proposals for organizing and conducting a counteroffensive on its own initiative.

Thus, they tried to transfer the laurels of victory to Khrushchev and Eremenko....

A. M. Vasilevsky answers this:

“At dawn on October 6, we, together with N.N. Voronov and V.D. Ivanov... went to the OP of the 51st Army... Here we heard the report of Army Commander N.I. Trufanov.

That same evening at the front command post, having met with the commander of the troops and a member of the Military Council, we once again discussed the plan for the upcoming counteroffensive proposed by Headquarters

And since the plan did not raise any fundamental objections from the front command, on the night of October 7 they prepared a corresponding report to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief.

On October 7, on behalf of Headquarters, I gave instructions to the commander of the Don Front to prepare similar considerations regarding my front.”

I think there is no need to add anything to what Alexander Mikhailovich said. The data presented by him convinces that the main role in planning a counteroffensive belongs to Headquarters and the General Staff.

In order to develop such a major strategic operation as the plan for an offensive on three fronts in the Stalingrad region, it was necessary to be based not only on operational conclusions, but also on certain logistical calculations.

Who could make specific calculations of forces and means for an operation of such a scale? Of course, only the organ that held these material forces and means in its hands.

In this case, it could only be the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff.

I repeat once again: the main and decisive role in the comprehensive planning and ensuring the counter-offensive at Stalingrad undeniably belongs to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the General Staff.

However, Eremnko was not completely untalented; he would not have been allowed anywhere near the front. War became a means of natural selection for military commanders.

THE MYTH THAT YEREMENKO WAS THE FIRST TO LEAD THE NKVD DIVISION INTO BATTLE

“Another innovation. In Stalingrad, my father took the liberty and for the first time introduced an NKVD division into the active forces, thereby encroaching on the diocese of Beria.

To decide on it, you had to have great courage, since the involvement of a whole group of security officers violated the rules of the political game that existed in the highest echelons of power and aggravated relations between Eremenko and Beria.

Challenge to the political regime! But Eremenko boldly takes full responsibility.

On the 4th Ukrainian Front, he again violates the ban: Eremenko takes more than a thousand snipers from two corps of NKVD troops and disperses them among the tired troops. Within two weeks, snipers destroyed 12 thousand enemy soldiers and officers, 11 enemies each. And the regime of that time did not provide for their use on the front line.”

This is absolutely something out of the ordinary.

Now, if Eremenko had not used the 10th division of the NKVD, this would have been a challenge to the political regime. Then all available military units nearby were thrown into battle.

And the full-blooded division initially heading to the Caucasus turned out to be manna from heaven when the Krauts broke through to the city.

The NKVD divisions gave up the fight much earlier.

1st Rifle Division of the NKVD Troops: “It began to form near Leningrad on August 22, 1941. It included soldiers of border detachments and units of internal troops of the NKVD Leningrad garrison..

A worthy contribution of the NKVD troops to the fighting during the defense of Leningrad in conditions of long-term defense was the sniper movement.

On February 22, 1942, a rally of sniper fighters took place in Smolny, to which the best warriors were invited - the founders of the sniper movement, who destroyed 4835 enemy soldiers and officers over four months of the war.

The ten best snipers of the Leningrad Front were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union by Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Two of them - foreman I. Vezhlivtsev and Red Army soldier P. Golichenkov served in the 1st division of the NKVD.

In total, by the end of 1943, the NKVD troops of the Leningrad Front had 3023 trained snipers. They destroyed 53,518 enemy soldiers and officers.

ORDER OF SUVOROV AND STAR OF HERO IN ONE DAY

It’s paradoxical, but two marshals who didn’t like each other so much received the Order of Suvorov on the same day.

Order of Suvorov 1st degree, Zhukov, Chuikov and Eremenko were awarded to him on January 29, 1943....

Zhukov received the 1st hero star back in 1939, the second hero star was awarded to Zhukov according to the decree of July 29, 1944, and what is most interesting is that by the same decree, the Hero star also went to Andrei Ivanovich Eremenko...

MARSHAL EREMENKO AT THE END OF THE WAR

In April 1943, Eremenko was appointed commander of the Kalinin Front troops, which remained relatively calm until September, when Eremenko carried out a small but successful offensive in the Nevel area.

Since October he commanded the 1st Baltic Front.

In February 1944, Eremenko was once again transferred to the south, this time to command the Separate Primorsky Army, which had the task of connecting with the 4th Ukrainian Front of General F.I. Tolbukhin with a strike from the Kerch bridgehead.

This task was successfully solved during the Crimean operation. When the army's troops united with the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front, it was included in the front, and Eremenko was transferred to independent command work - the commander of the 2nd Baltic Front.

During the summer strategic offensive of the Red Army in 1944, front troops carried out a successful Rezhitsa-Dvina offensive operation, providing the main attack of Soviet troops in Belarus from the north.

Enemy losses in killed and captured amounted to over 30,000 people. For this operation, Eremenko was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. August - carried out the Madona operation.

During the Baltic operation in the fall of 1944, troops of the 2nd Baltic Front advanced on Riga, fighting stubborn battles on numerous defensive lines with significant losses.

Only after the success of the troops of the neighboring front, General I. Kh. Bagramyan, who managed to break through to the Baltic Sea and block 30 German divisions in Latvia in the Courland Pocket, were Eremenko’s troops able to liberate Riga.

On March 25, 1945, Army General Eremenko led the troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front, which carried out the Moravian-Ostravian operation.

Over two months, irretrievable losses amounted to 23,964 people, sanitary losses - 88,657 people, average daily losses - 1,976 people.

These figures are also depressing because by the time the operation began, the Soviet army had superiority over the enemy in both artillery and aviation.

Critics of Marshal Zhukov should take this into account—Eremenko’s losses were always much higher.

CONCLUSION

Marshal Eremenko had a tough temperament and was not distinguished by talent or courage.

During the war, he became one of the main culprits of catastrophic defeats, the defeat of the Polar Fleet, the death of troops near Bryansk, his units practically surrendered Stalingrad...

These failures had to be corrected by Marshal Zhukov, who was so unloved by Eremenko, and Zhukov coped with this task.

Who was Marshal Eremenko?.....a stupid person, a traitor, or was he used for the dark?

It's hard to say for sure.

“Trench Truth” by Marshal Eremenko
It is scarier and more tragic than the truth of an ordinary soldier / Article 2000

Marshal of the Soviet Union Andrey Ivanovich Eremenko, who commanded the Bryansk, Stalingrad, Kalinin and other fronts during the Great Patriotic War, became not only one of the commanders of the victory, but also its chronicler. More about Marshal Eremenko

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Army General Andrei Eremenko at one of the defense sectors of one of the armies of the Kalinin Front. Summer 1943 / Photo from the personal archive of Andrei Eremenko

He wrote his first book about the war, “Stalingrad,” in rough form in the spring of 1943, while recovering in the Tskaltubo sanatorium after the most difficult trials he suffered in the battles for the city on the Volga. In 1950-1960 Eremenko created a number of fairly well-known works of military memoir literature: “At the Beginning of the War”, “In the Western Direction”, “Years of Retribution”.
Despite the strong touch of ideological predicament, inevitable in those years, Eremenko’s books are very, very interesting. From them the reader learns important details of the operations carried out under the leadership of the marshal, has the opportunity to see the work of the commander in detail, and evaluate the problems of command and control.

The abundance of details in Eremenko’s books is largely explained by the fact that his memoirs are based on his own diaries, which he kept throughout the war, literally day after day in certain months.

As you know, it was strictly forbidden to keep such records in a combat situation: they were of great interest to enemy intelligence. General Eremenko (he became Marshal of the Soviet Union in 1955) deliberately violated this prohibition.

"Our great generals fell ill with lordship..."

On April 29, 1943, Eremenko signed a report on the acceptance of the Kalinin Front from Army General Maxim Purkaev. For a week he then traveled around the armies, studied the condition and operational position of the troops, and became acquainted with the command staff. And here is the entry in the diary for May 7, 1943: “Commander Kuzma Galitsky and his army (3rd shock - A.P.) made a good impression. Commander Konstantin Golubev, an old acquaintance from the Bryansk Front, was removed by me from 13 1st Army. The report on the state of the troops is very chaotic and illogical, it is difficult to understand the state of affairs. Comrade Golubev was noticeably worried, sweat poured from him."

Next, Eremenko moves on to the problem that worried him most at that time - providing the troops with food. His predecessor organized this matter extremely poorly, which resulted in the arrival on May 6 of the Kalinin Front of a commission of the State Defense Committee headed by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, the head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army, Colonel General Alexander Shcherbakov: “there were major power outages, people were malnourished due to poor organization of supplies, for which Purkaev was removed. In the first quarter of 1943, there were 76 deaths from exhaustion. In connection with this, a conference of doctors was held, including the head of the sanitary front, arguing that our rations were inadequate. bad - there are few calories, because of this the soldiers suffer from dystrophy and die. We defeated this harmful theory. We organized normal supplies, control over the safety of food, and things went smoothly."

In an entry for May 23, Andrei Ivanovich lists in detail the content of the measures taken to restore order in the supply of food and summarizes: “Unfortunately, some commanders, some through negligence, others through negligence, paid little attention to nutrition issues, not understanding the importance that it has on the moral the state of the troops, the soldier's mood, the formation of vigor and enthusiasm... What did I discover in the 43rd Army? The commander of the army, Lieutenant General Golubev, instead of taking care of the troops, began to provide for his own person. He kept one, and sometimes two cows for personal satisfaction ( for the production of fresh milk and butter), three to five sheep (for barbecue), a couple of pigs (for sausages and hams) and several chickens. This was done in full view, and the front knew about it.

Our personnel officers know people very poorly and, unfortunately, often take a formal approach to the selection of senior team personnel. When we studied the Russo-Japanese War at the academy, we laughed heartily at General Sakharov, who was carrying a cow in a heated vehicle... And now we have General Golubev who is even worse than Sakharov. Laughter and grief.

Can such a general make a good warrior? Never! After all, he thinks not about the Motherland, not about his subordinates, but about his own belly. Just think - he weighs 160 kg."

On June 24, having again toured the positional area of the 43rd Army, the front commander returned to this topic: “Golubev’s command post, like a cowardly person, is located 25-30 km from the front edge and is a fortified node with an area of 1-2 hectares, surrounded by two rows of barbed wire. In the middle is a brand new, chopped, five-walled building with Russian carvings, just like a boyar's mansion. The house has four rooms, decorated in the latest fashion, and a dungeon of two rooms, so there is enough space for both adjutants and the commander's staff. In addition, a house was built for the messengers, orderlies, kitchen and security. The dungeon and the entrance to it were better decorated than the Moscow metro. Golubev was very fond of smoked meats: sausages, hams, and especially fish, he kept for this man. Shabalov, a member of the military council of the army, did not lag behind the commander.

A lot of effort and money was spent on this construction; two engineering battalions worked for almost a month to build such a command post. This was done at a time when there was an acute shortage of sapper units for engineering work at the forefront. The line clearly characterizes these would-be leaders. Shabalov, by order, must deal with the rear, but he has no time, and the rear is neglected, the roads look especially bad... In this army... from the army commander to the unit commanders, everyone has his own personal kitchen and a large number of people seconded to service... Many families of the commanding personnel came to the officers - the people began to rebuild in a peaceful way. This had a very bad effect on the combat effectiveness of the troops, measures had to be taken to remove the uninvited guests... I, of course, restored order there and ordered the commander and a member of the military council that all my comments that I made should be immediately taken into account, otherwise they will be accepted very strict measures."

Eremenko did not change his opinion about Konstantin Golubev in the future. In 1944, Konstantin Dmitrievich parted with the troops and became the first deputy commissioner of the Council of People's Commissars for the repatriation of Soviet citizens, in 1949-1953. taught at the Military Academy of the General Staff.

And here’s what the entry for May 23 says about another army commander: “When checking the 39th Army, it was discovered that its army commander, General Alexei Zygin, was terribly wasting food. It’s simply amazing how people lose their commander’s honor and their party conscience. Zygin drank too much vodka 310 liters (drinking a liter a day is enough for a year), and he took such products as sausage, butter, cheese, sugar... All this was done in conditions where food supply was difficult both in the country and in the country. The troops have not been supplied."

Andrei Ivanovich makes a generalization: “People like Golubev and Zygin are insignificant in business, they are gluttons and philistines, they accidentally end up in high positions and leave them ingloriously.”

To be fair, it should be noted that Lieutenant General Alexey Ivanovich Zygin died in battle in 1943, commanding the 4th Guards Army.

"Comrade Stalin is significantly to blame for the extermination of military personnel..."

It is known that during the entire war Stalin went to the front only once and only for one day. It was August 5, 1943. In fact, it all came down to a face-to-face meeting with the commander of the Kalinin Front, who was preparing the Smolensk offensive operation in the village of Khoroshevo near Rzhev.

After a detailed conversation with Stalin about the Battle of Stalingrad (the victorious laurels in which, according to Eremenko, belonged to him to a much greater extent than to any other military leader, including Zhukov), Andrei Ivanovich was preparing to outline his plan for the Dukhovshchina-Demidov operation and He had already begun to attach a map with a decision to the wall, but the Supreme Commander stopped him with a gesture and started talking about personnel. And here is Eremenko’s direct speech: “Comrade Stalin is significantly to blame for the extermination of military personnel before the war, which affected the combat effectiveness of the army (for 1943, this is an amazingly courageous assessment, because Joseph Vissarionovich never committed this guilt to anyone, as, indeed, and others, did not recognize. - A.P.) That is why, before starting to listen to the plan for the upcoming operation, he turned the conversation to the topic of personnel in order to test me... During this conversation, Comrade Stalin repeatedly spoke about many generals, who were released from prison just before the war and fought well.

“Who is to blame,” I timidly asked Stalin, “that these poor, innocent people were imprisoned?” - “Who, who...” Stalin said irritably. “Those who gave sanctions for their arrest, those who were then at the head of the army.” And he immediately named comrades Voroshilov, Budyonny, Timoshenko. They, according to Stalin, were largely to blame for the extermination of military personnel. They were the ones who were unprepared for war. But the worst characterization... was given to them for the fact that they did not protect their military personnel. Actually, in this conversation I listened more and answered questions. Stalin asked me how well I knew this or that marshal, a general who had been released from arrest. As for the marshals, I gave an evasive answer, saying that I didn’t know them well, from afar. The party created authority for them, and they rested on their laurels. Therefore, they performed poorly in the Great Patriotic War. This is how people talk about them, I also share this opinion. “What the people say is correct,” Stalin interjected. Regarding the released generals, I said that comrades Gorbatov, Rokossovsky, Yushkevich, Khlebnikov - all of them during the war, and some before it, were under my command, and I give them the highest rating, since they are smart generals, brave warriors , devoted to the Motherland. “I agree with you, Comrade Eremenko,” remarked Stalin. Every time, speaking about personnel, he looked at me intently, searchingly, apparently in order to determine what impression his characteristics and assessments of people made on me.”

"Grechko is an inexperienced commander and also soft-hearted"

Victory at the front was given to the Soviet soldier with unforgivably great blood. Eremenko's diary 1944-1945. leaves no doubt that the main culprit for the unjustifiably high losses at the final stage of the war, as a rule, were generals or officers who failed to properly organize the battle, use all means to suppress enemy defenses, who did not learn to maintain interaction with other branches of the military, who showed sluggishness, disorderliness, carelessness.

A typical example of this is the Moravian-Ostravian operation. It was carried out from March 10 to May 5, 1945 by troops of the 4th Ukrainian Front, first under the command of Army General Ivan Petrov, and from March 25 - Army General Eremenko. Irreversible losses in it amounted to 23 thousand 964 people, sanitary losses - 88 thousand 657 people, average daily losses - 1 thousand 976 people. These figures are even more depressing because by the time the operation began, our army had an absolute superiority over the enemy in artillery (10-15 times) and in aviation.

From the records of the front commander it is clear why the death toll was so high: “April 10, 1945. In the morning I was in the Tunskirch area, where the 1st Guards Army began to operate (under the leadership of Grechko. - A.P.). I drove forward to the commander’s OP howitzer artillery regiment of Colonel Abushev. He set up his OP either because of cowardice or because of incompetence in a house from which the front line is not visible at all... Having reprimanded the artillerymen, he ordered them to immediately change the OP. He shamed the commander 107-. of the corps for the fact that artillery fire is not fired at the enemy, and if it is fired, it is blind, since the artillerymen can’t see anything from the OP, and there are no forward observation posts. The artillery commander Cariofilli terribly neglected the leadership of the units subordinate to him. He is a bad organizer. also a coward, it seems to me...

April 16, 1945... At 9:30 a.m. I ordered the head of the operational department to show me a map with the position of the units by the hour. This was not on the map. The position of the units at the beginning of today's attack is not even plotted. The head of the operational department (General Korovikov - A.P.) did not know exactly where the divisions were located. I had a hard time with Comrade Korovikov. He reprimanded him for such an irresponsible attitude towards the matter and warned that if this happens again, he will be removed from his post... I spoke with Grechko. He scolded... Grechko does not use artillery units in the fight against enemy tanks... fire control, interaction between infantry and artillery are very poorly established... Grechko ordered to go to the corps and organize the battle properly, send operational workers to the divisions...

April 17, 1945... The artillery offensive in the 1st Guards Army was poorly organized... I called the artillery commander (of this army - A.P.), talked to him about how to mass the fire. After all, the infantry is bleeding, and the artillery, due to the disorganization and irresponsibility of the commanders of the artillery formations, cannot provide significant assistance to it... I had a private, as they say, heart-to-heart talk with the army commander, Comrade Grechko. He directly told him that he had lost control of the troops and looked like some kind of wet chicken - the headquarters were inactive, the commanders of corps and divisions did not see the battlefield, the artillery was silent, its observation posts were behind the army's OP... He demanded that Grechko restore order with the control troops, adding that otherwise I will be forced to report to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief about the poor command of the army...

April 29, 1945, NP of the 1st Guards Army. I called the chief of staff of the 127th Rifle Corps to the phone. He asked what milestone the advanced units of the corps had reached. Does not know. The neighbor on the right also doesn’t know where he went. He just doesn’t know anything... He called an army engineer. He established that he was not conducting engineering reconnaissance, he did not know where the bridges were in working order and where they were not, and in general whether there were or not bridges at the crossings occupied yesterday... He ordered to call an army chemist to find out how the fumes were used. The wind is favorable for the smoke outlet. There was no chemist at the OP... The height from which the enemy was firing and impeding our advance, of course, had to be covered with smoke, but the army command didn’t think of it... Two operatives arrived to report. The results of the trip are reported to the crossings and to the forward units. They were confused, they even forgot the map, they couldn’t report anything...

April 30, 1945... I spoke with Batyunya (chief of staff of the 1st Guards Army - A.P.). He reproached him that the artillery still lags behind the infantry combat formations... The headquarters and command of the 1st Guards Army are terribly clumsy. Batunya himself is overly calm and slow in his work, undemanding and does not organize control enough. Grechko is an inexperienced commander and also soft-hearted."

Every day of the Moravian-Ostravian operation is marked in Eremenko’s diary with similar entries. He also speaks unflatteringly about the commander of the 60th Army, Pavel Kurochkin, who did not know how to dispose of the flamethrower battalion handed over to him and sent flamethrowers... to repair bridges in the army rear, instead of giving them to the troops breaking through heavily fortified defenses to burn out enemy pillboxes. He criticizes the commander of the 8th Air Army, Lieutenant General Rubanov, who turns a blind eye to the “poor performance of aviation”: bomb strikes were carried out aimlessly, in one pass, “when it was necessary to stand in a circle and approach the targets one after another three or four times.” He talks about the division and corps commanders who were personally punished by him, who withdrew from leading the first echelon troops and who have already begun to celebrate the end of the fighting.

Of course, facts of this kind are not the whole truth about the final months of the war. There were successful commander decisions and mass heroism of the soldiers; Eremenko, by the way, writes a lot about this. But the main thing is that the marshal’s records help to understand why the price of Victory was so enormous.