How to explain high or low birth rates. Low Fertility and Population Aging: Causes, Consequences, Policy Options
1. TR Malthus as the founder of the science of population growth.
The years of the life of Thomas Malthus: 1766-1834 He was an English clergyman, then professor of modern history and political economy at the East India Company College. His main book, An Essay on the Law of Population, or an Account of the Past and Present Operation of this Law on the Welfare of the Human Race, was written in 1789.
Malthus argued that the world's food production is growing in arithmetic progression (1,2,3,4,5...), while the population of the Earth - in geometric (1,2,4,8,16...). This will inevitably lead to a situation where most people will face the threat of starvation. Only the strongest and most cruel can survive in such conditions. These ideas inspired Darwin and Wallace to create a theory in biology about the struggle for survival. So that people can avoid poverty and starvation, epidemics and wars for a piece of bread, Malthus proposed the following measures to solve the problem of overpopulation:
· abstaining from early marriages,
· prevention of too large family growth,
· refusal to marry low-income people,
· observance of strict moral standards before marriage,
· rejection of programs of social assistance to the poor.
However, he opposed birth control, believing that if married couples could easily limit the number of children, the primary incentive for socio-economic progress would be lost: people would lead an idle lifestyle and society would stagnate. Subsequently, the idea of birth control as a means of combating disproportionate population growth began to play a major role in the concept of so-called neo-Malthusianism.
In the social hierarchy, people are arranged according to the principle of the fittest, that is, the elite are the fittest people, the mob are the least fit people.
2. Demography.
Demography is the science of the size, composition and change of population. In recent years, Russia's population has been declining at a catastrophic rate. Because of this, schools, kindergartens and nurseries began to close. Most people blame the economic crisis for this, but the example of Western countries shows that economic prosperity does not always lead to higher birth rates. Population growth rates are among the most dramatic indicators:
· 1 million years ago, the population of the whole world was only about 125,000 people,
· 300,000 years ago - 1 million people,
· by Christmas - 285 million people,
· in 1930 - 2 billion people,
· in 1960 - 3 billion people,
· by early 2009, the world's population was 6.6 billion people.
The main causes of the population explosion: The population explosion began in Europe in the 19th century. In the Middle Ages, Europe had high birth and death rates, many children were born, but they could not be treated, and a large proportion of children died from epidemics and famine, so population growth was minimal. For example, Peter 1 had 14 children from two wives, of which only 3 survived. In modern times, the birth rate remained high, but medical care improved and welfare increased. This was the cause of the population explosion during the period of industrialization.
The reasons for the decline in the birth rate in modern developed countries: In the 20th century births and deaths in Russia, Europe and North America have declined, so population growth has again become minimal, the population of some countries even began to decline. This is especially dangerous against the backdrop of a population explosion in Asia, Africa and Latin America. This demographic situation inevitably leads to migration or even invasion of the population from Asia, Africa and Latin America to Europe, North America and Russia. The first harbinger of such an invasion was Islamic global terrorism, the war in Chechnya, American operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. There are predictions about the possibility of a Third World War by the West against the Islamic states. Russia is on the border of a population explosion, on the southern borders of Russia there are countries with high population growth rates - China and Islamic countries. In China, they are trying to combat excessive population growth with taxes on the second child, which has led to the emergence of "underground", unregistered children. In Russia, there was a population explosion in the 19th century. - early 20th century But the population growth resulting from this explosion was destroyed in the course of the terrible historical cataclysms that befell the Russian people in the 20th century. The Soviet Union had demographic problems in the late 1950s as a result of World War II, as very few children were born during the war and many men died during the war. Today, many Russian people migrate from neighboring countries to Russia. In ancient times, an example of migration was the great migration of peoples - the Huns, Avars, Goths, Suebi, Vandals, Burgundians, Franks, Angles, Saxons, Lombards, Slavs in the 4th-7th centuries AD. In the 7th-9th centuries AD. there was a migration of Arabs, Normans, Proto-Bulgarians, Magyars. Migration from Europe to the United States was especially intense in the 19th and 20th centuries.
3. Other reasons for the decline and increase in the birth rate in the global world.
More boys are born than girls, but men die at an earlier age than women. The small number of adolescents leads to a labor shortage. Urban residents have fewer children than rural residents, since for rural residents many children mean many laborers in the household. Highly educated women have few children, as they are forced to spend time primarily on education and career during the childbearing period of their lives. Before deciding to have a child, parents make a calculation of the possible costs and their income. In a large family, parents oppose their children receiving a high level of education. Many children die before the age of one year, because they have not developed enough immunity to diseases. The mortality rate is affected by sanitary conditions (quality of drinking water and so on), the quality of medical care, the quality of nutrition.
4.Modern demographic crisis and depopulation in Russia.
At the end of 2009, the population of Russia amounted to 141 million 927 thousand people. Population growth in the country has stopped since 1991, the birth rate in the RSFSR fell below the level of simple replacement of generations back in the 1960s. Today, the death rate is 1.5 times higher than the birth rate, the population is declining by several hundred thousand people annually. A negative feature of Russia is the fact that the birth rate has fallen to the level of developed countries, while the death rate has remained at the level of developing countries. Alcohol mortality in modern Russia (600-700 thousand people per year) is associated with the world's highest level of consumption of legal and illegal (surrogate) alcoholic beverages. Population decline is somewhat stifled by immigration - primarily ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers from Kazakhstan, Central Asia and Transcaucasia - but to date, these reserves are declining due to inflexible immigration policies. By 2050, Russia's population is estimated to be between 83 and 115 million people According to the 2002 Population Census, the population of Russia fell by 1.8 million from 1989 to 2002. Every minute 3 people are born in Russia, and 4 die. The global trend is opposite: the ratio of births to deaths is 2.6. Mortality is especially high among Russian men, whose average life expectancy is 61.4 years. The life expectancy of women is 73.9 years. According to Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Zhukov at a government meeting on February 17, 2010, the increase in the average life expectancy of the Russian population has been going on for several years. In 2009, this figure increased by more than one year (1.2 years) and averaged over 69 years for both men and women. In 2009, 1.764 million children were born in the Russian Federation, which is 50 thousand or almost 3% more than in 2008, while the number of deaths decreased by 62 thousand or 3%. According to Zhukov, the natural population decline has decreased by more than 30% compared to the level of 2008. "For the first time in 19 years, we are seeing a natural increase in the population in the Urals and Siberian federal districts," the Deputy Prime Minister said. He also said that, according to preliminary data, at the end of the year, the population of Russia, taking into account migration, increased for the first time in 15 years.
5.Mortality and life expectancy in Russia.
6.Fertility.
The birth rate in Russia does not reach the level necessary for simple reproduction of the population. The birth rate is 1.32 (number of children per woman), while simple reproduction of the population requires a birth rate of 2.11-2.15. At the beginning of the 20th century, Russia had the highest birth rate in Europe. The most rapid decline in the birth rate occurred in the 1930s and 1940s. By 1965, the birth rate in the RSFSR had dropped below the level of simple generational reproduction. In the 1980s, there was an increase in the birth rate, due to government policy measures. In the late 1980s, the birth rate began to decline again. Against the background of an increase in mortality, a demographic decline arose (mortality is greater than the birth rate). Regional differences in fertility are gradually smoothing out. If in the 1960s the total fertility rate was 1.4 in Moscow and 5 in Dagestan, by now this figure has hardly changed in Moscow, and in Dagestan it has fallen to 2.13.
7.Migration situation in Russia.
Russia is in second place in the world (after the United States) in terms of the number of legal and illegal immigrants. There are more than 13 million of them in Russia. - 9% of the population. In 2006, a law was passed that greatly simplifies labor migration. One of the factors worsening the demographic situation is the illegal trade in young women of childbearing age. According to some estimates, hundreds of thousands of women were taken abroad by deception, but the state practically does not combat this phenomenon.
There are two opposing points of view on attracting immigrants:
· Attracting migrants will increase the competitiveness of the Russian economy through cheaper labor. To maintain numbers
population at the same level, it is necessary to attract at least 700 thousand immigrants per year, and to maintain the working-age population - at least 1 million per year.
· Attracting unskilled migrants does not increase the production of goods. Economic growth in the long run can
take place only by increasing labor productivity - that is, by increasing qualifications and wages, and not by reducing them.
Often, among the demographic threats to the security of Russia, a possible “quiet expansion” from the densely populated China in relation to the Far East, followed by the rejection of this territory according to the “Kosovo scenario”, is mentioned, while for proof, the population densities of the Far East and China differ by dozens of times. However, in China, due to the unfavorable climate, the population density decreases from the central provinces to the north and northeast, and the border regions of Russia are often even more densely populated than the neighboring counties of China. From this we can conclude that the Russian Far East is not an overly attractive target for immigration. In the Far East today there are between 30,000 and 200,000 Chinese, which is not enough for "demographic expansion." At the same time, the proportion of young people among the population is rapidly declining in China.
8. State demographic policy.
In 1944, awards to mothers of many children were established in Russia - "Mother - Heroine" and "Maternal Glory". In 1952, a two-week maternity leave was introduced. At the same time, it was during Stalin's time that the birth rate fell the most. From 1925 to 2000, the total fertility rate in Russia decreased by 5.59 children per woman (from 6.80 to 1.21). Of these, 3.97 children, or 71% of the total decline, occurred in 1925-1955 - the “Stalin era”.
In 2001, the "Concept of demographic development" was adopted Russian Federation for the period up to 2015". In 2007, a new "Concept of the demographic policy of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2025" was adopted. In Russia, small state payments are made at the birth of a child, as well as assistance for the maintenance of a child to low-income families. In a 2006 address to the Federal Assembly, President Vladimir Putin formulated a number of measures to stimulate the birth rate, including large payments for the birth of a second child. The corresponding law on "maternity capital", which allows you to receive 250 thousand rubles. through participation in mortgages, tuition fees and an increase in pension savings, has been in force since 2007. Left political forces use the demographic problem to accuse the government of pursuing an "anti-popular policy" and consider it necessary to dramatically increase state assistance for the birth of a child. Opponents of this view cite data showing that the birth rate in a country does not depend on social benefits in that country. For example, in Sweden, social benefits are much higher than in the United States, while the birth rate is lower there (when compared with developing countries, where social benefits are almost non-existent and the birth rate is huge, the difference is even more noticeable). From this, it is concluded that an increase in payments in Russia will not lead to an increase in the birth rate. Attempts to financially stimulate the birth rate evoke a response either from marginal groups of the population, or from representatives of ethnic groups that already form large families; for the middle class, this is not a serious motivation.
Appendix to §37.
Results of the All-Russian Population Census of Russia in 2002
It found that between the last two censuses, from 1989 to 2002, the population of Russia decreased by 1.8 million people to 145.2 million. The national population structure: the number of Russians - 115.9 million, or 79, 8% of the total population, Tatars - 5.6 million, or 3.8%), Ukrainians - 2.9 million, 2%, Bashkirs - 1.7 million, 1.2%), Chuvash - 1, 6 million, 1.1%, Chechens - 1.4 million, 0.9%, Armenians - 1.1 million, 0.8%. The number of Muslim peoples amounted to 14.5 million (10% of the population), Christian - 129 million (89%). After the census, the share of Russians decreased from 81.5% to 79.8%.
73% of Russians are urban residents, 27% are rural. Moreover, a large proportion of the urban population is concentrated in large cities. One third of the population of Russia is concentrated in the largest cities - "millionaires" (13 cities): in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk, Yekaterinburg, Nizhny Novgorod, Samara, Omsk, Kazan, Chelyabinsk, Rostov-on-Don, Ufa, Volgograd, Perm. Moscow is one of the 20 largest cities in the world. The parameters of the birth rate of the urban and rural populations are converging. The 2002 census recorded a significant excess of the number of women compared to the number of men, which amounted to 10 million people. The ratio of men and women according to the 2002 census in Russia was 53.4% of women and 46.6% of men.
The census recorded an excess of the number of elderly people over the number of children:
18.1% of the population are children
61.3% - working age population
20.5% are older than working age.
Global demographic crises and trends of the 20th century: the first World War(1914 - 1918), Civil War (1917-1922), famine in the USSR (1932-1933), period of collectivization and mass repressions (1930-1953), World War II, deportations of peoples, post-war famine, economic crisis of the 1990s . According to demographer Anatoly Vishnevsky, Russia's total direct and indirect demographic losses in the 20th century as a result of wars, famines, repressions, economic and social upheavals are estimated at 140-150 million people. Without all these losses, the population of Russia by the end of the 20th century would have been twice as large as it actually turned out to be. The last demographic crisis has been going on for more than 10 years, and, despite the absence of wars and repressions, the birth rate remains at an extremely low level, although recently it has been growing quite steadily (but, however, at a rather slow pace). Similar 10-year periods of sharp decline in fertility were observed in almost all developed countries, except Israel. This crisis is explained by the overexploitation of the population, in a developed market society; at the same time, the emerging shortage of labor resources is covered by migration and the transfer of production to demographically prosperous countries. The period of the demographic crisis completely coincides with the periods of "shock therapy" in all European countries of the former socialist camp.
During the 20th century Russia's population is aging. When compared with other countries with low fertility, it turns out that Russia's population is not the oldest. In 1990, it ranked 25th among such countries (a more dramatic position in Japan, Italy, Germany). Currently, the proportion of people aged 65 years and older in the population of Russia is 13%. According to the UN scale, the population is considered old if the proportion of this age exceeds 7%. Compared to the 1989 census average age population of the country increased by 4.3 years and amounted to 37.1 years. The aging of the population in the near future may adversely affect the development of the country's economy and gives rise to the problem of financing the pension system. Some officials are now proposing to raise the retirement age for people. But such a decision of the government can cause an explosion of discontent among the population.
Questions for reflection.
1. Which of the two opposing points of view on attracting migrants do you think is more correct?
2. In your opinion, is Chinese migration dangerous for Russia?
3. In your opinion, is it necessary to increase state benefits for the birth of a child?
4. Do you think the retirement age should be increased?
One of the most pressing problems for the national security of the Russian state is the demographic situation in the country. It is known that the birth rate in modern Russia, despite a certain improvement associated with a relative increase in living standards in the 2000s (compared to the 1990s) and some government measures to stimulate demographic growth, remains at a fairly low level. At the very least, it is hardly possible to say that the Russian birth rate currently covers the needs to replenish the country's population. Russian citizens are rapidly aging, especially in the "Russian" regions of the country, where the lowest birth rate is observed.
Causes of the demographic decline
A strong demographic decline was observed in Russia throughout almost the entire twentieth century and was associated not only with changes in the socio-economic and socio-cultural foundations of the Russian state, but also with the fact that during the years of wars, revolutions, collectivization and industrialization, political repressions, the Russian state lost 140 -150 million people. Accordingly, since a significant part of the dead and dead were people of both sexes of childbearing age, as well as children and adolescents, the number of potential newborns that could be born to victims of global cataclysms of the national economy has also decreased by tens of millions of people.
However, an equally significant role in the demographic crisis in Russia was played by the decrease in the number of children of the average Russian woman. According to A. Vishnevsky, one of the largest domestic specialists in demography, for the period from 1925 to 2000. the birth rate decreased by an average of 5.59 children per woman (Vishnevsky A. Demography of the Stalin era). Moreover, the most active decline in the birth rate occurred in the period from 1925 to 1955. - that is, for periods of industrialization and collectivization, the Great Patriotic War, the post-war restoration of Soviet infrastructure. The population of modern Russia is annually decreasing by about 700 thousand people, which allows us to speak of the country as gradually dying out (yes, this is exactly how President Vladimir Putin himself described it, without embarrassment of these words, back in 2000, and 6 years later - in 2006 year - he said that the population of Russia by the end of the 21st century could halve if drastic measures are not taken to improve the demographic situation in the country).
Very often in everyday judgments about the reasons for the decline in the birth rate, there is an explanation of the low birth rate by social conditions, first of all, by the insufficient material well-being of the population, the lack of highly paid jobs for parents, separate and large housing, the infrastructure of kindergartens and schools. However, when compared with third world countries or the same pre-revolutionary Russia, such arguments do not hold water. We see the conditions under which the bulk of the Central Asian population lives, not to mention the Africans or the inhabitants of South Asia. However, overcrowding, poverty (and sometimes outright poverty), the lack of social prospects does not prevent people from having children - and in quantities "from five and above."
In fact, the reasons for the decline in the birth rate in Russia in the 20th century lie rather in the ideological plane. Their main stimulus is the devaluation of traditional values and the destruction of the way of life of the Russian and other peoples of the country during the revolution and, especially, the post-revolutionary Stalinist transformations. It is impossible not to pay tribute to the Stalin era as a period of maximum development of industry, defense, security of the Soviet state, the spread of universal literacy of the population, the availability of medical care (albeit not very qualified, but still significant).
However, for a rapid breakthrough in the economy of the USSR, the mobilization of the largest possible number of citizens was required, the involvement of almost the entire able-bodied population of the country, including both men and women, to work. According to A. Vishnevsky, "the very methods by which the Stalinist leadership of the USSR achieved - and achieved - a "great turning point" in people's life were such that they recklessly destroyed the entire system of traditional values, including family values" (Vishnevsky A. Demography during the Stalin era).
Despite the fact that Stalin and his entourage negatively assessed the activities of the “leftist” wing of the Bolshevik Party, which insisted in the first post-revolutionary years on the complete destruction of the institution of the family, which promoted the sexual freedom of men and women, freedom of abortion, in reality, the “left communists” had a lot borrowed. And, first of all, a specific model of the organization of family relations. It can be called proletarian, since it was precisely among the proletariat, as a class of hired workers, predominantly living in cities and employed in factory production, that such an organization of the family became possible. For a peasant, the number of children did not really matter, moreover, having many children was in favor, since children are future hands, where you can feed two, you will always feed three, and so on. The peasants also had the opportunity to accommodate numerous offspring in their hut, in the case of growing up children - in a hut built nearby, in an annex.
In contrast to them, the urban proletarians, huddled in the rooms and apartments of tenement houses, could not afford a large offspring. And due to the lack of places for accommodation, and because of the different nature of labor activity - the proletarian worked for wages and the child became just another eater, reducing the well-being of the family without any return (when he grew up, he did not work on his father's farm, like a peasant son, but went to his own "bread", that is, he did not bring direct material returns to his parental family). Moreover, in urban proletarian families, as a rule, women also went to work. Women workers, who found themselves in a situation of independent choice of work activity, place of residence, formed a completely different model of sexual behavior. Firstly, they were much less dependent on the opinions of others than peasant women. Second, as self-employed workers, they could afford the behavior they saw fit. Naturally, for them, having many children was an obvious hindrance - after all, it directly interfered with factory work.
The concept of the "new woman" and fertility
Ideology family policy Soviet Russia was formed under the influence of the concepts of the “new woman”, which began to take shape as early as the 19th century in the works of both domestic and foreign writers and philosophers of a revolutionary democratic persuasion. In Russia, N.G. wrote about the “new woman”, first of all. Chernyshevsky. In the West, the idea of women's emancipation has been much more developed. The ideology of feminism has been formed, which currently includes many branches - liberal, socialist, radical, lesbian and even "black" feminism. What led to the spread of feminism in countries Western Europe- you can not remind, this situation is deplorable enough for European societies and is the cause of considerable contradictions between different groups of the European population.
In Russia, feminist ideas, including the concept of creating a “new woman,” found grateful supporters among representatives of revolutionary parties and movements, primarily social democrats. The Socialist-Revolutionaries - "populists" were still to a greater extent soilmen, although similar theoretical constructions spread among them. During the revolutionary years, Alexandra Kollontai became the main theorist of the concept of the “new woman”. This amazing woman - a politician, a diplomat, a revolutionary - managed not only to form her own concept of family and sexual relations in a socialist society, but also to demonstrate to a large extent with her own biography what the image of a “new woman” is.
According to Kollontai, the traditional image of a woman from time immemorial has been associated with humility, focus on a successful marriage, lack of initiative in building one's own life and life independence. A traditional woman is such a specific addition to a man, his companion and comrade-in-arms, deprived, in fact, of her own “I” and, often, of her own dignity. In contrast to the traditional image of a woman, Kollontai put forward the concept of a “new woman” - self-sufficient, active politically and socially, treating a man as an equal and really being his equal in building her own independent life.
The image of the "new woman" is, first of all, the image of an unmarried woman. Let's add - and, as follows from the disclosure of this image, childless - because the presence of a child, especially two or three, not to mention five, deprives a woman of her independence in the understanding of Alexandra Kollontai. She names three main principles for building new love and marriage relationships: equality in mutual relations, mutual recognition of the rights of another without claiming full possession of the heart and soul of a partner, comradely sensitivity towards her love partner (Kollontai A. The road to winged eros. 1923 ).
Already in the mid-1920s. Kollontai's work was officially criticized in the Soviet Union. Gradually, its concept also turned out to be forgotten - they preferred to remain silent about it. Moreover, as the Soviet statehood strengthened, the country's leadership had no other options but a partial return to traditional values. In the official press, literature, cinema of the Stalin era, the type of Soviet woman was promoted, who manages to combine the features of the “new woman” Kollontai in terms of party and social activity, labor exploits, and the traditional family behavior of mother and wife. However, it is not difficult to guess that the ideology of the Soviet state was at odds with the actual practice of organizing family and demographic policies. Formally, motherhood was promoted, divorces were evaluated negatively, in 1936 the Soviet government banned abortions, but in fact the social policy of the Soviet state was not aimed at really strengthening the demographic foundations of the country.
The decline in the birth rate during the Stalin era indicates that the measures taken to ban abortion did not produce the desired result. First, in the Soviet Union, women in the bulk were employed. Those who received higher and secondary vocational education, after graduating from educational institutions, were sent to work by distribution - often in completely different regions of the country. Their chances of a quick marriage went down. And the system of state propaganda itself, to a large extent, did not orient women (as well as men) towards family values.
Although the Soviet state needed numerous workers, soldiers and officers, new engineers and scientists, and indeed took colossal steps in this direction (suffice it to look at the number of educational institutions of all levels that appeared precisely in the Stalin era, at the number of children "from the people", who received a high-quality professional education and achieved heights in various fields of scientific, military, industrial, cultural activities), something turned out to be irretrievably lost. And this “something” was the very meaning of childbirth and the creation of a strong, full-fledged family. The family was deprived of its economic, economic, social content, although it was proclaimed a “cell of society”. Children could be brought up in a kindergarten, husbands or wives could be changed periodically (if they didn’t suit some nuances of living together, or even simply “tired”), the cohabitation of a man and a woman in a city apartment had practically no economic value.
After Stalin's death and the "de-Stalinization" of the Soviet Union, even those measures to preserve the birth rate that Stalin tried to introduce by banning abortions were canceled. Despite the fact that after the war there was even some growth in the population, it was not possible to reach such a birth rate that would allow the population of the Soviet state to multiply over time. What happened in the post-Soviet period should not be reminded. In the 1990s, economic factors also played their role, and, to an even greater extent, the final destruction of traditional values and their replacement with a Westernized surrogate. Moreover, if in the Soviet model of family and sexual policy, women at least focused themselves, if not on family life, then on creative activity “for the good of the motherland and the party,” then in the post-Soviet period, the values of personal material well-being finally overshadowed all other life guidelines.
Since motherhood and marriage have ceased to be seen as real values by most of the Russian youth, a global “lack of children” has formed.
Although many sociological surveys of young Russians indicate that the family remains the most important life value for Russian youth (or at least the second most important), there is a clear discrepancy between the desired (which Russians answer to sociologists) and the actual. The latter is not encouraging - the country has an extremely high divorce rate - 50% of marriages break up, which keeps Russia among the world leaders in the number of divorces. As for childbearing, only in the 2000s, after the introduction of real material incentives, citizens began to give birth to more children (however, some skeptics explain the relative increase in the birth rate in the country in the 2000s by the fact that during this period the generation of the “demographic boom” entered childbearing age » of the 1980s, and the socio-economic conditions of life in the country have relatively stabilized).
An important role here was played by the introduction of so-called payments. " maternity capital”, which is paid at the birth of a second child and reaching the age of three years. The decision to start paying maternity capital was made in 2006, and in order to prevent the possibility of its use for personal gain by representatives of marginalized groups of the population, it was decided not to issue it in cash, but to issue a special certificate that allows you to purchase housing for a certain amount , close a mortgage loan, pay for a child's education.
Currently, the maternity capital is about 430 thousand rubles. The amount is rather big - in some regions of Russia you can buy your own housing with it, or at least really improve your living conditions. The conditions and the emergence of other opportunities for spending maternity capital in the interests of the family and children are discussed. However, it is impossible to achieve an increase in the birth rate only with material motivation. Especially if you take into account the fact that in order to receive maternity capital, you still need to give birth to your first child. Therefore, some sociologists are very skeptical of the very idea of material stimulation of the birth rate, referring to the fact that only representatives of the marginalized strata of the population or migrant diasporas will give birth in order to receive assistance from the state in the amount of 430 thousand rubles. That is, even in this case, the problem of the demographic security of the Russian state will not be solved.
Abortion threatens demographics
Another problem in Russia in the field of fertility is abortion. Abortions were officially allowed in Soviet Russia immediately after the October Revolution. In 1920, the RSFSR allowed abortion not only for medical reasons, becoming the first country in the world to legalize abortion. In 1936, abortion was banned and re-legalized only in 1955 after the policy of "de-Stalinization". Between 1990 and 2008 in post-Soviet Russia, according to official figures, 41 million 795 thousand abortions were performed. This number covers the real needs of the Russian state in the labor force (about 20 million people in the specified period), which allows many public and political figures to consider abortions as a direct threat to the demographic security of the Russian state.
Today, about half of the country's population opposes abortion in Russia. Sociological surveys show a gradual reduction in the number of abortion supporters - from 57% of respondents in 2007 to 48% in 2010 (Levada Center. On the reproductive behavior of Russians). Anti-abortion views are usually expressed by nationalist political movements and religious organizations. Among them there are both absolute opponents of any abortions, including even abortions for medical reasons, and moderate opponents of abortions, recognizing the possibility of their commission in justified cases (medical indicators, rape, social disorder, etc.).
First of all, Russian public figures and traditionalist philosophers object to the practice of abortion. For them, abortion is not only a threat to the national security of the Russian state, one of the reasons for the reduction of the potential population of the Russian Federation, but also a challenge to religious values, traditional worldview guidelines that were originally inherent in almost all peoples of the world, but are collapsing in the process of detraditionalization of modern society, the assimilation of individualistic and consumerist values of modern Western capitalism. After all, the ideology of "child free" - voluntary childlessness, elevated to valor by modern "creakles" and narrow-minded consumers seeking to imitate them, is a purposeful planting of essentially anti-Russian principles of refusing to have children, creating a full-fledged family in the name of "own realization", which is more often of everything is just an opportunity for everyday and carefree "hangouts", shopping, or even just idleness, drunkenness and drug addiction.
Decreasing the birth rate is one of the goals of numerous “family planning” associations that originally emerged in Western Europe at the initiative of feminist movements and sponsored by international financial circles interested in reducing the population - primarily in developed countries, since here a large population means and growth of social responsibility and economic burdens on capitalists. Therefore, it is more expedient to “reduce” the number of the indigenous population, while simultaneously importing foreign migrants from the backward states of the “Third World”, who will be ready to perform hard work without social guarantees and any requirements to improve their situation (now the experience of modern Europe shows that this is far from this is not the case, and many migrants do not work at all in their new place of residence, but they really demand social guarantees and all sorts of privileges, but it is no longer possible to change the situation for most Western countries).
Philosopher Oleg Fomin-Shakhov, who is one of the most staunch opponents of abortion in modern Russia, emphasizes that “the problem of abortion for today's Russia is primarily a problem of demographic security. At the International Conference on Population and Development, held in Cairo on September 5-13, 1994, a program of action was adopted, which in essence represented for Russia voluntary-compulsory self-reduction sanctions. The program said that for sustainable regional and global socio-economic development, it is necessary to take measures to reduce the birth rate, primarily through the development of family planning services (contraception, sterilization, abortions “in adequate conditions”)” (O. Fomin-Shakhov, Russia without abortions, Zavtra Newspaper, electronic version of June 5, 2014).
At the same time, Oleg Fomin-Shakhov suggests using the American experience of the prolifer movement, that is, opponents of abortion and supporters of saving human life already in the womb. American pro-lifers, according to Oleg Fomin-Shakhov, for the first time transferred the topic of abortion to the plane of social problems, while before them abortion was regarded as a personal sin of a person or as a crime against the laws of the state. The question was also raised about the essence of abortion as an instrument of biopolitics to regulate the population of individual states. As for Russia, it is obvious that its vast territories and Natural resources have long been the envy of a number of neighboring states. Throughout history, the Russian state has faced hordes of foreign invaders, but today more far-sighted theorists and practitioners of the global financial oligarchy can afford to use such technologies as biopolitics, that is, regulation of childbearing in Russia, the level of mortality of the population, including propaganda mechanisms - propaganda of abortions, "free" lifestyle, all kinds of social deviations, criminal subculture, etc.
Another well-known philosopher Alexander Dugin, in his article "Procreation as a Philosophical Problem", connects the lack of desire for childbearing with the destruction of the traditional values of Russian society, the rejection of religious values and the assimilation of alien individualistic models aimed at the exceptional "intrinsic value" of a person. Within the framework of this axiological model, childbearing becomes an obstacle to the "free", but in reality - aimless and characterized only by consumerism - human life. “The system of dirty monstrous lies, undisguised Russophobia, aimed at destroying our cultural and physical code, leaves no desire to create an honest, cultured, Orthodox Russian family and raise a large number of wonderful Russian children. And it is far from obvious whether it will become an argument for young people that if they do not give birth to children, there will be no Russia, ”writes Dugin (A. Dugin. Childbearing as a philosophical problem).
Should abortion be banned in modern Russia? Of course, a total ban on abortion is hardly possible in modern conditions. And this step will not be really justified and understood by the population. However, strict control over the practice of abortion must be introduced - and this is one of the necessary measures in the direction of ensuring the demographic policy of the Russian state. First of all, all cases of abortion by Russian women should be strictly controlled, taking into account the reasons for their commission. So, according to medical indicators, in the interests of saving the life of a woman, after rape (the criminal background of abortion), abortions should be allowed. The possibility of abortions should also be left for families that already have several children or are experiencing reasonable financial difficulties.
However, the bulk of abortions performed by women who are young, childless, middle- or high-income women with no apparent health problems should be banned. Note - there is no encroachment on the personal freedom of a woman. It is enough to use contraceptives, not to have a promiscuous sex life, that is, to take care of yourself and adhere to at least elementary moral and ethical principles, and the need to periodically run for an abortion will disappear by itself. In the end, in most countries of the world - in almost all Latin American states, countries in Africa, the Islamic East, in some Catholic countries in Europe, abortions are prohibited, and these countries somehow exist, many - quite well.
Are there any prospects?
The practice of material stimulation of the birth rate, to which Russia switched during the years of V.V. Putin, is of great importance for the development of the birth rate in the country. However, it is impossible to induce people to create families and give offspring by economic messages alone, especially in modern society with its temptations and informational pressure of relevant propaganda. A whole range of measures is needed - in the social, economic sphere, in the sphere of culture and education, health care, which creates the prerequisites for a truly full-fledged upbringing of little Russians and for their very birth. This includes the payment of decent benefits for child care, and the possibility of introducing a “mother's salary” for women with many children who decide to devote themselves entirely to caring for a child, and assistance to children's families in improving their living conditions (increasing living space depending on the growth in the number of children in the family) , and providing additional means of transport, household appliances for large families. All these activities should be carried out at the federal level and under the strict control of the relevant authorities.
In any case, without going into specifics, it should be noted that the Russian state can find opportunities to organize such events in the direction of ensuring the country's demographic security. It will not be shameful to involve public organizations that for a long time, at their own peril and risk, at their own expense, have been working among the country's population, promoting the values of the family and childbearing, preventing the spread of Western values alien to Russian society. On the other hand, it is possible to use foreign experience, including the invitation of proven foreign experts for consultations in the direction of improving the demographic policy of the Russian state.
But the main attention of the state should be paid to the information and propaganda policy. While consumer values are being advertised in the media, in cinema, the model of behavior of a "socialite" - a prostitute who does not have children - is portrayed as a desired for a woman, Russian men are denigrated, shown as losers, from whom it is impossible to give birth to children, even a threefold increase in maternity capital, the introduction of additional childbearing benefits will not improve the situation in the sphere of demographic security of the Russian state.
V information sphere the Russian state should take as a basis the policy of promoting a strong and large family, spreading the cult of fatherhood and motherhood, and increasing respect for child men and women. Special TV shows, Internet sites, and printed publications that affirm family values should be created. Moreover, the activities of these projects should be adequate and in demand in modern conditions, which will require additional involvement of specialists in the field of psychology, television and radio broadcasting, journalists, cultural and art workers. Accordingly, educational institutions should also implement a policy aimed at affirming family values and correct models of sexual and marital behavior. Mechanisms can be developed to support young mothers in obtaining vocational or additional education on preferential terms. The Russian state must understand that without people there will be no state, without children there will be no future. It is people who are the main value of Russia and the Russian authorities should take care of their worthy existence and reproduction.
The demographic catastrophe of the 1990s and early 2000s has receded. But the number of Russian people continues to decline, and migrants from Central Asia come to take their place. We need to react. Not only to the state, but also to ourselves ...
“Men become feminine”: why the birth rate has fallen in Russia
According to Rosstat, the birth rate in Russia fell to ten year low. For the first time in recent years in The country experienced a natural population decline. RIA Novosti figured out why this happened and what to expect in coming years.
Back in 1990s
According to report Rosstat, in 2017 -m in Russia on light appeared 1.69 million children. It's on 203 thousand or on the 10.7% lessthan a year earlier. According to this indicator, 2017 was the worst year for ten years - v last time fewer newborns in Russia was only 2007. The decline in the birth rate is observed in all regions of Russia except Chechnya. They gave birth actively, on 2016 level — 29 890 people. Max drop - v Nenets Autonomous Okrug (minus 16.5%), followed by — Chuvashia (minus 15%).
But there is also reasons for optimism. Mortality in Russia in also dropped markedly last year. year in 1.824 million people died in the country. It's on 63 thousand less than in 2016 — lowest inXXIcentury indicator. significantly reduced and infant mortality. In 2016 on 1000 births, 6 children died, in 2017 — 5,5.
However, all this is not helped to keep the natural population growth. fixed natural decline - minus 134.4 thousand people. In 2016, it was plus 5.4 thousand. But the total population of Russia still increased over migratory flow account. For a year in The country has added 200 thousand visitors. The main donor countries were Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine.
Surprisingly, these results for no experts become. Scientific Supervisor of the Laboratory of Population Economics and demography of the Faculty of Economics of Moscow State University Valery Elizarov says that demographic difficulties are inevitable as at least in next 15 years. He calls the socio-economic situation of the 1990s the main reason.
“The birth rate depends on number of young women in reproductive age. V last year the 18th anniversary was reached by the smallest in Russian generation - born in 1999 throughout the second half of the 1990s and the first half of the zero years, the birth rate was extremely low. The increase began only after 2006. We had absolutely wild swings associated with socio-economic shocks. Second half of the 1980s - 1986-1987 - 2.5 million births! Then fall - To mid-1990s, there were 1.3-1.4 million births in year. Finally, 1.2 million 1999”, Elizarov notes.
The expert points out that now the age of childbearing is the generation of those who were born v period of demographic crisis. “Give birth children now most often 25-26 years old. Those who were born in 1992-1993 and at this time, a fall was already recorded. Now you yourself understand that this is not yet the end", Elizarov says.
women men
Together with only the problems of the 1990s explain the situation exhausted. Yes, there are fewer women, but because and each individual woman gives birth less. The attitude of citizens towards building a family, priorities have shifted. According to data the same Rosstat, average age of a Russian mother - 26 years. It's on five years more than 1990s. During this time, the interval between appearances in family of the first and second child. In the 1990s it was three years on average a in 2017 - already 5.6 years. Thus, the birth of the second and subsequent children moved behind mother's 30th birthday.
Professor of the Department of Labor and social politicians Institute of Public Service and management (IGSU) RANEPA Alexander Shcherbakov points out that the cause should also be sought v low standard of living and striving for at the expense of work, own labor to improve the well-being of the family. In addition, at Russian women in in general, now much more career ambitions. “We have a paradoxical situation: about their gender purpose, women think only in second turn. They share more male look at a lifewhere is the career at first place. And modern men are more and more like women. They often don't set themselves the task of financially providing for the family, Shcherbakov warns.
The authorities of the country understand that the situation is very serious, and take action. Yes, in November 2017 Russian President Vladimir Putin announced about the "reset" of the country's demographic policy. In December, the head of state signed law O monthly payments to families after the birth of the first child. On average, the amount 2018 will be, in depending on region, 10 523 rubles, v 2019 — 10 836 rubles, in 2020 — 11 143 rubles. Direct payment, The calculation takes into account the income of each family. Right to receiving money is provided to those who is the average income for family member is not exceeds one and a half times the subsistence minimum.
Besides, in December, the President signed a law on extension until the end of 2021 maternity capital programs. At the birth of the second third child, citizens of Russia are entitled to payment. Her size in 2017 — 453 026 rubles.
no sex want
The solution of economic issues, however, is not panacea. It is enough to look at global trends. According to the data UN, from 21 countries with the highest birth rates 19 are in Africa. All European states belong to countries with the lowest birth rate, although it is clear that the economic situation much better there than African continent.
Sexologist, head of the Sexual Health Center Anna Koteneva believes that the decline in fertility affects the specific modern morality. “Too much unnecessary information, too much fuss. Modern man lives on principle "here and now”, “after me even a flood”. Everyone wants to enjoy life, responsibility, in including for children are perceived as burden. Selfishness, individualism, independence, even infantilism rules“, she says.
Koteneva adds that current technologies seem to open up endless possibilities for communication, many moral prohibitions have been lifted. “But the current generation is not able to communicate often doesn't want it. The value of physical intimacy has declined. Used to be sex for young people was something forbidden, mysterious, desirable. It's available now, but got up in one row with other pleasures, entertainment, intimate relationships depreciated”, says the sexologist.
No matter how was, forecasts for the near future is not too optimistic. Rosstat warns: natural population decline is expected every year up to 2035, a the peak will be 2025-2028 years. This trend will be counterbalanced by migration growth, but population of Russia, demographers believe, in the specified period will still be reduced.
Demography: Russia is being let down by the "women's issue"
The Federal State Statistics Service of Russia published the Demographic forecast before 2035. By According to the forecast of Rosstat, it is expected that the population of Russia by 2036 will remain at 2017 level - 147 million people, plus or minus a few percent. At the same time, the share of the working-age population will remain almost constant. - 55-56%. Such data is not enough to number of working ages see internal changes. After all, if in within these 55–56%, there will be an increase in the number of the young part to age 40, and a decrease in the number of the older part of the working age, then a favorable demographic future for Russia lies ahead. AND quite different awaits us if, on the contrary, the young part will decrease.
Developing the Rosstat forecast, (what method - about see below), it is possible to determine the dynamics of the number of young ages up to 2040.
separate men and women on graphs do not make much sense, since recessions and rises in dynamics of the future number of 20-year-olds, 30-year-olds and 40 year olds almost double. A number of men and women in ages from 20 to 40 years differs only by a few percent.
What does this diagram make clear?
First. The number of 20-year-olds will increase to 2035 but slightly.
Second. Number of 30-year-olds in will begin to decline in the coming years. And in in the first half of 2020, the contraction will be very strong - about 10% annually.
Third. Number of 40-year-olds up to second half of 2020 will increase. But this increase will be small. A v 2030s will begin to decline, from about toy the same speed as the reduction of 30-year-olds in 2020 years.
So that total strength young part of working age between 2018 and 2040 will decrease.
V conclusion
V In recent years, official publications have been full of peppy statements about the emerging long-term favorable trend in the demography of the Russian people.
V In Russia, the Russian people make up about 80% of the total population. So the results of the spectral analysis of the Rosstat forecast can be extended to Russian people.
Like or dislike, but for peppy statements about the emerging long-term favorable trend in the demography of the Russian people - there is no reason.
The demographic transition - the process of reducing the birth rate and mortality - is an ambiguous phenomenon. On the one hand, it helped raise the standard of living in many countries, brought women into the labor market who no longer have so many children. Investments in education and health of people have grown. These "windows of opportunity" will be available for several decades to developing countries in which the demographic transition has recently begun. Developed countries, the pioneers of this process, are already reaping its benefits: they are rapidly aging, they spend a lot on pensions and have entered the peak of their birth rate, a leading Spanish demographer, professor at the Complutense University of Madrid argues in the HSE Demographic Review magazine. David S. Reher.
Both progress and considerable costs - this is how the “dry residue” of the demographic transition can be characterized. Its waves (the second of which occurred in developed countries in the 1950s-1980s) always resonate with socio-economic changes in society. Moreover, according to many experts, the decline in mortality and fertility is one of the root causes of socio-economic transformations. Professor, Faculty of Political Science and Sociology, Complutense University David S. Reher gives the demographic transition just such a meaning, specifying, however, that this process is still part of the overall picture of the modernization of society in developed countries (the expert dates it to 1850-1975). Signs of modernization are rising living standards and education, urbanization, women's emancipation, the displacement of agriculture by industry and the service sector, and the emergence of a consumer society.
Now that the pioneering countries of the demographic transition are already fully confronted with its derivatives in society, it is already possible to accurately assess its pros and cons, notes David Reher in the article “Economic and social consequences of the demographic transition”, published in the journal Demographic Review. The article is constructed dialectically: on the one hand, the author recognizes certain "gains" of the demographic transition, on the other hand, he immediately finds the insidious underside of these phenomena.
The economy has benefited from demographics
For many reasons - from the development of immunology thanks to Louis Pasteur, the retreat of epidemics, the accumulation of knowledge about competent child care and ending with better nutrition for people - in the twentieth century there was a process of reducing child and infant mortality. This began to influence reproductive decisions: the drop in mortality was followed by a decrease in the birth rate, associated with the conscious regulation of reproduction. Women began to give birth to fewer children. This made it possible to devote more attention to those few heirs who were born, and also freed up time for the mothers of families for self-realization and allowed them to go to work. According to some estimates, as a result of the demographic transition, women began to spend on average not 70% of their adult lives on bearing and raising young children, but five times less - only 14%.
Thus, at the individual level, solutions related to birth control appeared.
At the same time, adult mortality also declined as living standards improved: both nutrition and health care improved.
Since the decrease in mortality preceded the decrease in the birth rate and the second process was slower, the countries leading the demographic transition managed to use “demographic dividends” in the economy. Their essence is that the number of generations born is still growing, and the population remains quite young and able-bodied.
As long as this period lasted, and the economy was able to create the right amount of new jobs in response to growing demand, there was a “window of opportunity” for a sharp economic recovery. A similar strong influence of demographics on the economy is also seen in the example of countries that have made a sharp jump in development relatively recently: these are the “Asian tigers” ( South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan), as well as Iran and Brazil. The "young" sex and age structure of the population usually affects the growth of labor productivity, the researcher adds.
However, the period of “demographic dividends” passes with time. Between the late 1950s and the early 1980s, the number of newborn cohorts began to decline. This means a reduction in the population of working and reproductive ages. Thus, the demographic transition inexorably leads to the aging of the population and increasing the burden on the economy of the elderly.
Population aging has led to the creation of pension systems
At the same time, if there were no such demographic transformations, they should have been invented, if only for the sake of the emergence of pension systems. The importance of the latter cannot be overestimated: they remain an integral component of relative social harmony.
The accelerated aging of the population is becoming a challenge to all social systems based on intergenerational income transfers. A generous redistribution of funds is proving problematic. To mitigate this effect, according to a number of experts, the fact that “savings during life cycle in conditions of low birth and death rates will lead to a higher capital-labor ratio, which will at least partially reduce the burden of the demographic burden on the elderly,” the article notes. Long-term accumulation of human capital can also lead to an increase in living standards, adds David Reher.
Migration solves the problem of labor shortage
The demographic transition stimulated migration, which became more or less effective tool population redistribution. The sending countries thereby reduced the population's burden on resources, more successfully solved the problems of employment of residents and received fuel for the economy through remittances from migrants to their homeland. The host countries solved the problem of labor shortages.
At the same time, now in a number of countries, the researcher recalls, due to the excessive migration flow, the recipient countries are increasingly tightening their entry policies.
Demographic transition popularized education
The described demographic processes have led to the fact that women also have the opportunity to "re-educate", and investments in the education of children have grown, Reer writes. “The movement towards universal education for children has been a hallmark of the most developed societies for a century, and more recently governments and families in the developing world have also pursued this goal,” the researcher points out. In general, parents have become more attentive to the quality of their children's education.
As for women, along with the demographic transition, the factors for the spread of their work were largely the consequences of the Second World War, access to economic opportunities in the service sector (the male “monopoly” ended here), the increased role of public institutions - primarily schools - in the education children, as well as the increasing importance of the consumer society.
Marriage is bursting at the seams
In fact, the role of women in society has changed radically due to the demographic transition - it has become more active, the researcher writes. However, these transformations led to negative consequences - the devaluation of the institution of marriage.
Relations between husband and wife, men and women have become more “volatile”. Emancipated ladies began to perceive marriage differently. It has ceased to be lifelong, it became possible to replace the "wrong" partner. Life strategies in this sense have acquired great variability.
Benefit for developing countries
Reducing population growth rates in developing countries (by which the author of the article means China, Costa Rica, Iran, Morocco, Tunisia, Venezuela, Turkey and a number of other countries) will allow them to significantly improve the standard of living of people and modernize, David Reer is convinced. In almost all of these countries, the health of adults and children is improving, the level of education and the proportion of working women are growing, and society is being significantly restructured. In these countries, economic growth has so far outpaced population growth by a margin.
At the same time, the aging of the population in developing countries will go much faster than in Europe, the expert noted. This is due to the higher rates of decline in fertility and mortality than in the countries leading the demographic transition. In almost every developing country in this sample, the number of births has steadily declined at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries. Over the last 15-20 years total number births in China and Tunisia fell by 31%, in Iran - by 33%, in Morocco - by 19%, Reer points out.
If this trend continues (and there is every reason to expect it), then the rapid aging of the population will begin, the expert writes. In a few decades, these countries will face a decline in the population of working and reproductive ages, which will affect both the labor market and the future number of births. Thus, for developing countries, the most important question is how long the demographic window of opportunity for the economy will be open.
Hurry up to take advantage of demographic bonuses
This promising window is unlikely to remain open for too long, says David Raer. Only for China, which still has a relatively young population amid state birth control policies, could the window of opportunity last up to 40 years. However, in China, the prospects are not easy (see the article “China's economy depends on its demographics” about this) - a decrease in the proportion of the working-age population, which is expected in the next decade.
The rest of the countries, the expert believes, have been given even less time to take advantage of the chances of socio-economic transformations. This period ranges from 10 to 30 years. “It is difficult to resist the fear that when the window of opportunity closes, the levels of social, economic and institutional development in many of these countries may not be sufficient,” the researcher emphasizes. In any case, they must mobilize their forces and complete their development process as quickly as possible, concludes David Reher.
Let's now look at the myths about the causes of fertility decline and point out the real reason for this phenomenon.
Myth one: Fertility decline is a natural phenomenon and should be accepted as the norm. A nuance is important here: yes, the phenomenon is natural for sociogenesis (more on that later), but it does not follow from this that it should be recognized as the norm. Here's "on the fingers": diseases are a natural phenomenon, aren't they? But this does not mean that they should be considered the norm - a completely healthy person should be the norm, even if he exists only in theory. Of course, modern postmodernism seeks to philosophically blur the concept of the norm, reaching the point “illness is just a different way of being” (J. Lacan), and liberal ideology demands that everything that does not bring direct physical harm to another individual be considered the norm, but let’s not be distracted.
The essence of the myth: all Europeans are like that - they don’t want to give birth, but are we slurping cabbage soup with bast shoes? There is nothing to worry about, we will die for the company!
From the fact that a decrease in the birth rate in modern society relative to the peasant one is natural, it does not follow in any way that a decrease in it below the level of reproduction should be considered the norm. Reducing is normal, but not that much! Once again I recommend Thilo Sarrazin's book "Germany: Self-Destruction".
Myth two- reduction of the issue to the economy: "if there is something to raise children - they will start it." The myth is easily refuted by the fact that in Europe, which was very prosperous in material terms, until recently, they did not want to give birth. Social payments are also not a solution to the problem, they do not increase the number of desired children in the family. There is a positive effect: women begin to give birth statistically a little earlier, but for this benefit should be large enough. The reason is simple: in any case, the maintenance of the child costs more than the size social benefits, and at the same time, after giving birth, a woman automatically lags behind in career growth and in most cases loses her qualifications somewhat, which affects further earnings. Well, to be honest, taking care of a baby, which is required around the clock, is much harder work than the usual work "from 9 to 18", especially if not in production, but just in the office (just don't fall into postmodernism like “both spouses must take maternity leave” - this will not solve problems with the family’s finances, and the man is evolutionarily “not imprisoned” for caring for babies, his role comes later). In other words, in order for social benefits to be guaranteed to increase the birth rate, they must at least equal the average salary in the country, which no state budget can withstand.
In addition, the payment of cash benefits really stimulates the birth rate - but it is precisely among the marginal part of the population, for which money is right now more important than the future of children. I will quote Vladimir Mukomel, a leading researcher at the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences: “Both foreign and Soviet experience demonstrates that attempts to financially stimulate the birth rate evoke a response either from marginalized groups of the population, or from representatives of ethnic groups prone to having many children.”
I note that against the background of this myth, there are sometimes calls for such a reduction in sociogenesis - they say, since the number of children decreases with an increase in living standards, then let's go back to the pampas! Only rural subsistence farming, only hardcore! Usually accompanied by immoderate religiosity. Due to the obvious insanity of the concept, we will not disassemble it: after all, if its propagandists are so against progress for humility, then why do they write such appeals on a computer on the Internet?
Myth three: declaring migration a panacea for all ills. I will quote Igor Beloborodov, director of the Center for Demographic Research: “Replacing migration carries a whole range of social risks that are already being felt today... Let us list just a few of them: disruption of the ethno-demographic balance; interethnic conflicts; the growth of drug addiction; ethnic crime; deterioration of the sanitary and epidemiological situation; the threat of losing strategic territories, etc.”
To be honest, I don't see the need to analyze this issue in detail; a violation of the ethno-demographic balance is enough. And if someone declares that there is nothing wrong with that - all people are equal, etc., then he should honestly, “on the forehead”, ask a question without arguing with the formal equality of rights, etc. different peoples: WHY are you promoting a position that inevitably violates the ethno-demographic balance of countries in the direction of reducing the relative number of representatives of the white race? On the example of the same Europe - everything is very clear.
Myth four: improving the quality of life is much more important than the quantitative growth of the population. The same attachment to money as in myth No. 2, but “from the other side”: they say, the quality of children depends only on the amount of money invested, you need to save! Once again I will quote I. Beloborodov: “It is often assumed that quality parameters can have a positive coloring only with a decrease in quantitative indicators. ... The main motive for reasoning about the priority of quality over quantity, as a rule, is the desire for the expedient spending of state and family funds.
And again: no one argues that the quality of life is an important parameter, but this does not mean that for this reason it is permissible to reduce the birth rate below the level of self-reproduction of the nation - obviously, right? Taking this opportunity, I note that, since fertility is important Total population, appropriate social guarantees are required for Total population, a guaranteed decent standard of living, and not abstract economic indicators such as GDP, and so on.
Fifth myth: family crisis. I clarify: the fact that the crisis of family relations takes place is a fact. And it negatively affects fertility (we will analyze in more detail in the next article). However, the myth lies precisely in what is declared paramount importance this factor. There is influence, but not critical: modern life allows you to raise children alone (which, of course, is bad - but possible), and even more so with the support of the family.
Usually this myth is pushed by the guardians of kondo-patriarchal values.
Perhaps, the “family planning” option can be indirectly attributed to the same myth (and to the same category of its adherents): they say that sexual education is unacceptable, it corrupts children, teaches them to protect themselves instead of marrying virgins and giving birth, giving birth, giving birth. Here it is necessary to distinguish between the need for adequate sexual information in school (and along with the ethics of intersexual and family relations, etc.), from what liberals understand by this: propaganda of the normality of homosexuality, etc., not to mention the approach to sex only as physiology - I think everyone is aware, and we will not be distracted. The difference is similar to the difference between the Soviet commission on juvenile affairs and modern juvenile justice.
Sixth myth- about the "decline of spirituality", i.e. earlier people were “highly spiritual” and gave birth, but now they have become materialistic and therefore do not want to give birth, but take care of themselves. Whether it’s a matter of ancient times, when children were born as if on a conveyor belt, half died in childhood, and whoever lived to forty years old is essentially an old man already, since the average life expectancy at the end of the 19th century in Russia was just over 30 years.
In this case, the standard posthocnonpropterhoc logical error is obvious: yes, a couple of centuries ago people were much more religious, but the high birth rate was also due to the lack of normal contraception, very early marriages, etc. Now you can compare the birth rate in very religious countries, and the birth rate in them will be quite clearly different: religious factors can delay, but not stop the development of society.
natural cause- this is peasantization, i.e. there is a process of reduction of the rural population in the cultivated area. I will quote A.N. Sevastyanov: “If at the beginning of the century the employed population of Russia consisted of 86% of peasants, 2.7% of the intelligentsia and 9% of workers, then by the 1990s. the share of workers in the RSFSR increased almost 7 times, the intelligentsia - more than 10 times, and the peasantry, as already mentioned, fell 7 times once again. It must be admitted that the communists brilliantly succeeded in the task that tsarism failed to cope with: the energy of depeasantization was taken under state control and spent, by and large, on useful, important, grandiose goals. And this is all for some seventy years - an unprecedented case in history that distinguishes us for the better from other peoples ”(note: the intelligentsia here means those engaged in mental work).
A high birth rate is observed in those countries where the majority of the population is rural. The transition to industrial production inevitably leads to a decrease in the birth rate. There are two main reasons, and they act not just simultaneously, but systemically.
First, the economic reason. A traditional society implies an appropriate type of management: some kind of hydroponic farms or even just high-tech land cultivation - this is already an industrial way of farming, and it also has a high “entry barrier” both in terms of age and skills - a seven-year-old cannot work as a combine harvester will be able. And in the traditional peasant life, he has long worked on the pickup, shepherd and so on. In such a household, the birth of children was economically profitable: they worked from early childhood. Industrial-type labor implies long education, etc., and children in the “family accounting” become an expense, not an income item. Compare the situations themselves “a five-year-old can already graze and feed poultry” (as an example) and “fully provide for a child at least up to 17 years old, and in most cases - seriously help at least until graduation” (and I am silent about the housing issue); clearly? The birth rate is causally correlated not with "spirituality", but with the norm of lack of education (however, "spirituality" and education have an inverse correlation). As soon as the people become educated, since labor requires education, the birth rate drops after a generation (the first retains the habit).
Secondly, the lack of industrial development always correlates with the lack of adequate medicine (and corresponding norms adopted by the population), which also applies to contraception. It is important to understand that we are talking not only about technical capabilities, but also about the culture of use: Postinor, and even more so abortion, is, you know, not a method of contraception, as some actually practice. And the approach of “pulling abortion before the deadline” does not have a positive effect on reproductive function. And all this is also a matter of culture, the naturalness of application, a responsible approach to childbearing. In traditional cultures, the approach “once it flew in, then give birth” is common (and when the corresponding level collides with the moral norm “not necessarily”, then mutations of the behavior of the type “abortion as contraception” are obtained).
Both causes are interrelated and have a systemic impact. Some researchers focus on urbanization, but this factor is derivative.
So: a scientifically substantiated reason for the decline in the birth rate is depeasantization, the transition to an industrial society. This is a natural process of sociogenesis, but the decline in the birth rate below the level of reproduction is the suicide of the nation. The question arises: is it natural not just to reduce the birth rate in a civilized society, but just to this extent? We'll talk about this next time.